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David Godden sounds a salutary warning for those working in argumentation
theory: to beware of the return of forms of psychologism that were thought
banished for good by Frege, Russell and others early this century. Of the cases
he cites I will concentrate on the discussion of feminist claims for alternative
‘female’ logics. But I will begin with the question of what is wrong with
psychologism. Godden cites Hacker and Baker’s definition of psychologism, in
which the danger of psychologism lies in the reduction of logic to
(psychological ) laws of thought. Frege’s own anti psychologism was more
general - as Dummett (1973,495) puts it ‘the interpretations of terms.. as
standing for mental images or other results of mental operations’. Why should
psychologism of either sort be a problem? Because – at least on Dummett’s
post Wittgensteinian version of Frege– a psychologistic theory of meaning fails
to explain the fact that we can communicate, and share meanings. A
psychologistic account of inference, on the other hand, makes validity a matter
of psychology, rather than of objective truth. That way lies a particularly virulent
form of relativism – in the case of logic, logical relativism: that the truths of logic
are determined by psychology, either at the level of the individual or the group.
What Godden points out is that while relativising validity to individual
psychological states is no longer fashionable, a version which relativises
validity to group rhetorical practices has come into vogue.
Logical relativism has been less fashionable than the analogous forms of
linguistic and ethical relativism. Logic is fundamental to the very practice of
argument, so that the dangers of self contradiction in arguing for logical
relativism are particularly obvious. It is this argument strategy which Godden,
quite properly, in my view, directs those who relativise logical validity to group
behaviour, or rhetorical strategies. If there is no more to validity than the
tendency of a group to treat a claim as valid, under whatever rhetorical rules
the group abides by, then Godden suggests, the notion of validity does not
have the normative force it should.
Godden’s argument here is not with those who, for logical reasons, want to
alter the formal definitions of validity for internal logical reasons, as for
instance, paraconsistent or relevance logicians do, presumably using only
paraconsistent or relevant steps. I assume he might well accept logically
motivated differences in logical practice, so long as they are argued on logical
grounds. This does not mean there is no problem in justifying deductive
practice: for in virtue of what is any justification justified? Recall Lewis Carroll's
"What the Tortoise said to Achilles". While such accounts are not Godden’s
target, however, the problems of justifying deductive practice might explain why
rhetorically based accounts are in vogue. Not only do rhetorical accounts
connect argument practice with formal schemes: they seem to offer a stopping
point on Carroll’s regress: the bedrock of sheer behaviour.
Note first that even Quine's (1970 et passim) view is that logical rules are
themselves a matter of convention. His holistic image is of a network of
interlocking beliefs, of which logical beliefs are themselves members. Revision
of logic would then theoretically be a possibility, but, according to Quine, our
current logical practice is enshrined in so far as it is the simplest and best
logic. Note that, paradoxically, Quine’s view is not inconsistent with logical
relativism, since the simplest apparatus to articulate the web is the one true
logic for the community. Others, such as Dummett (1975, 1977) insist that
there can be genuine debate about logic.
Dummett's argument strategy is controversial, and opposed to holistic views,
but it brings out another conception of the way in which our understanding of
logic is dependent on our understanding of language. While logic serves to
articulate the web of belief in the Quinean model, in Dummett's approach, the
logical operators are themselves part of the practice of language. The practice
of language so conceived is essentially public and interpersonal, for familiar
Wittgensteinian reasons, and understanding must be manifestable. If logical
truths - and more generally, reasoning- is part of linguistic practice then logical
truths derive their force from practice. Linguistic practice is the benchmark.
Logical practice can itself be criticised. If we wish to allow debate about logical
principles and their justification, we need to assume a particular logical
framework in which to conduct the debate. But this does not yet mean we have
to impose a global and objective logical model, based on, say, the Predicate
Calculus or classical deducibility. The debate may itself need to be framed in
particular logical frameworks, but so long as there is debate, there is room for
discussion.
The difficulty of justifying deduction is in part the difficulty of searching for a
transcendent level from which to assess logical practice. As Carroll pointed
out, that way leads to paradox or regress. But if we turn back to the very
practice of discussion between participants, then what counts as justified
deductive practice will be tantamount to what moves are acceptable within the
discussion. There may be no universal set of norms for logical constants which
apply regardless of the participants, but in so far as a discussion is possible it
will be in terms of shared logical norms - and there are surely general
principles which are conducive to 'reasonable discussion'.
Such is an attempt to give the sorts of reasoning which might be used to
rescue a rhetorical basis for logic. What then of the feminist accounts? My own
most unfashionable view on this is, in fact, the precise reverse of the strategy I
have just suggested, and agrees with Godden’s approach. We have well
documented evidence that there are gendered patterns of linguistic. Jennifer
Coates summarises the evidence in her book, Women Men and
Language(1986). Women - and girls - speak a language which is distinctive
from that of men at each level of linguistic description. At the phonetic level,
women tend to standard or dominant forms, while men tend to use dialectal
variants. At the level of vocabulary, women tend to use standard or socially
acceptable words, while men tend to older forms. At the level of syntax,
women's language differs substantially from men's. Robin Lakoff's classic
(1975) study of English, Language and Women's Place shows that women
use far more tag questions in statements than men. Thus, for instance, we find
forms like:
"The weather's been wonderful, hasn't it?"
where the final tag asks for confirmation. While men also use these forms,
women use them far more frequently, possibly indicating a need for
confirmation. Women are less likely to use the unmodified imperative ("Do
....!"), but prefer modalised forms ("We could do ..."). In rejecting others' claims,
they use concessive phrases, such as "I think.." rather than bold negations.
Perhaps the most interesting and evocative work in the analysis of gender
based distinctions in language use is at the higher level of discourse
structures. Deborah Tannen's book You Just Don't Understand (1991 argues
that women and men talk differently, women preferring self disclosure in their
intimate conversations, whereas men talk aggressively, in order to dominate
conversations.
Sociolinguists have documented a range of conversational strategies which
differ from men to women and which are liable to cause miscommunication.
Coates (1986,152-155) lists a number of causes of miscommunication. For
instance, there are differences in the meaning of questions for men and
women. For men, questions are seen as direct requests for information,
whereas women use and interpret questions as facilitating the flow of
conversation. There are differences in links between speaker turns: men break
in with their own opinions or even new topics, whereas women tend to
acknowledge previous contributions and listen to others as they take turns.
There are differences in attitudes towards self disclosure, which is an
exception in male-male conversation and normal in female-female talk. Coates
summarises the differences by classifying men's talk as competitive and
women's talk as cooperative.
My own view is that very often what appears to be a gender based difference
of logical behaviour is better interpreted as the same logical move made in
other words. If I say:
‘Well I wonder whether you might look at that differently…’
I might well have just as forceful a knockdown argument as a man who says:
‘Hah , caught you - here’s a counter example’
We need to interpret as best we can the differing utterance style, and impose a
logical order. I think there are linguistic reasons for arguing that the same
logical utterance might be made very differently by different genders. If that is
so, we may not need to revise logic for rhetorical reason – perhaps we could
have a good and non ad hoc theory of how the same logic can look
superficially very different in different conversations. Indeed I think that this is
the most productive way of dealing with the moral issue of feminine views of
reason.
The tradition of regarding women as weak in reasoning skills, and indeed of
defining the feminine in opposition to the analytic and the rational has been
documented by Gennie Lloyd in The Man of Reason (1984). Lloyd shows how
discussions of reason have, implicitly or explicitly, excluded the feminine,
making reasoning a public, objective, impersonal activity not open to the
private, intuitive female, embedded in the personal social structures of the
home and family. There are two diametrically opposed reactions to such
evidence. On the one hand, we can argue that analytic talk is phallocentric and
bad, and that the 'intuitive' female logic is to be preferred. On the other hand,
we can argue that the alienation of women from the tools of analytic thought,
such as higher mathematics, is a socially engendered iniquity which needs to
be remedied. Lloyd’s view is attractive:
"The claim that Reason is male need not at all involve sexual relativism
about truth, or any suggestion that principles of logical thought valid for
men do not also hold for female reasoners......Philosophy has defined
ideals of Reason through exclusions of the feminine. But it also contains
within it the resources for critical reflection on those ideals and on its own
aspirations." (1984,109)
We need not be rhetoricians or go in for psychologism to reflect on our own
practice, but we had better be aware that it might be fallible.
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